At present, Europe is still telling itself a very comforting story. The main theme is that the Russian gas shock has been absorbed, storage is full, and prices are manageable. At the same time, politicians keep stating that diversification has delivered “energy independence.” While repeating this with confidence doesn’t, however, make it true. Behind all these political slogans, Europe’s gas strategy is increasingly showing that it has been built on a fallacy. The latter is clear and steadily unravelling. At present, a new, clear signal has emerged, not yet mentioned in international or even national media, not coming from Putin or Trump, but from The Hague, the government center of the Netherlands. A growing number of Dutch politicians and experts are currently focusing on the Groningen gas field, meaning a once-taboo discussion has resurfaced. The current, still largely quiet discussion is focusing on whether the Netherlands should keep the infrastructure of the Groningen gas field intact as a strategic backup in the event of a crisis, which could provide Europe with a critical resilience option amid geopolitical uncertainties.
The position of the Groningen gas field has been misunderstood, as it was never just a gas field. Somehow forgotten by most, it was the continent’s largest onshore gas reservoir. It played a pivotal role as a stabilizing anchor for Northwest European supply, while, not liked at all by some, it was seen as a symbol of sovereign optionality. The political decision to close the field was driven by legitimate seismic concerns and a societal push to make it a political necessity. However, a growing number of people and so-called experts also began to believe that redundancy had become unnecessary in a globalized, rules-based energy system. This, as shown by a long list of conflicts, disruptions, and a new geopolitical order, however, has collapsed. Not yet recognized or pushed by the majority, the Groningen debate should be seen as a mark of Europe’s first quiet admission that energy security cannot be outsourced entirely. Energy security is not only to be left alone to market, to allies, or to ideology.
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The return of the Groningen debate and its role, especially in the strategic conversation, exposes the central contradiction of Europe’s post-2022 gas policy. The EU, or Brussels, has claimed independence and autonomy for years, but reality on the ground shows that it has only swapped one dependency for another. After decades of relying on pipelines, tying Europe to Russia, LNG cargoes have now linked Europe to the United States. According to European data, 59% of EU LNG imports now originate from the US. In any assessment, especially when the supplier is a non-US one, this would clearly not be seen as diversification; it is concentration. And this US concentration is power.
From a geopolitical perspective, the current situation gives Washington a strong lever over Europe’s energy system. It should be realized that this US-EU situation looks as uncomfortable as the one Moscow once wielded. Until now, the real difference is still not structural but political. Until now, Brussels and all European countries have regarded US leverage as benign, as the US is considered an ally. However, as history has shown before, energy security does not depend on friendship alone. Real energy security is based on control and predictability. At the same time, it also includes having the ability to act independently in moments of stress. When taking these three criteria, it is worrying to see that Europe is more exposed than it admits.
The reemergence of the Groningen discussion is now cutting through this illusion. The Dutch are not (yet) considering reopening the Groningen field as a conventional supply source. The debate at present, however, is focused on whether dismantling the physical infrastructure, its wells, compressors, pipelines, and grid connections, should be considered a major strategic error, considering the current global upheaval and unpredictability of it all. Without a doubt, if everything is removed, the infrastructure cannot be restored within months or even years. To keep it all in place while closing total production, using it strategically as a form of shadow capacity will, of course, be politically uncomfortable, but available in extremis.
This is not to be seen as a theory of longing for the past or a nostalgia for fossil fuels. The main discussion should focus on how to maintain optionality in an era of systemic instability.
European media, supported by politicians, has framed Europe’s energy strategy since 2022 as a triumph of diversification. The emergence of major LNG terminals across Germany, the Netherlands, and beyond supported the latter. At the same time, LNG cargoes were sourced from the US, Qatar, and elsewhere. What, however, was not understood at all is that diversification without redundancy is still dependency. By expanding the set of actors (suppliers), redundancy was not strengthened. LNG markets are global, not Euro-centric, competitive, and increasingly volatile. LNG cargoes, and even contracts, will always be driven by price signals, shipping availability, insurance costs, and contractual obligations, not by European policy priorities or dreams.
Why is this now to be discussed? In recent days, the American “LNG bazooka” has become the centerpiece of Europe’s energy narrative, but not in the right way. Washington proudly presents LNG exports as a geopolitical service, presenting its volumes as a shield against Russian coercion. There is truth in this, as until now, for Europe, US LNG has been indispensable. However, the term bazooka implies something LNG is not. It is not under sovereign control, as LNG cargoes cannot be redirected at will until now. US LNG is owned by private companies, all of which are bound by long-term contracts. But at the same time, they are increasingly exposed to domestic US politics and vulnerable to global crises, sometimes even caused by US unilateral actions, exposing Europe to significant supply and geopolitical risks.
In a true stress scenario, which should include not only Asian demand surges, shipping disruptions, and insurance withdrawals, but also the impact of the US domestic backlash against exports. This constellation will always make it clear that Europe’s access to LNG is not guaranteed. Europe should reassess its view that the US would always prioritize Europe over its domestic politics or higher-paying Asian buyers. The latter is an assumption, but not a law of nature. Brussels, or its member countries, should understand that energy security built on assumptions is not security at all.
The above is where the EU’s gas independence narrative will be dangerous. The EU increasingly frames US LNG as proof of strategic autonomy. The reality, however, is the opposite. When 60% of LNG comes from one country, that country holds leverage. This means it can choose to use it or not. Europeans should understand that strategic autonomy is not about who their supplier is. It is about whether you can function if that supplier hesitates, reprices, or reprioritizes.
The Dutch Groningen discussion about the availability of its infrastructure is therefore not a Dutch curiosity. It is a continental warning sign heard all over Europe. At present, Brussels is rediscovering a principle it once understood instinctively: energy systems require buffers. In defence, redundancy is accepted as necessary. In energy, it has always been treated as inefficiency, a cost factor. That mindset no longer fits the world Europe inhabits.
International crises, such as the Red Sea, have demonstrated how fragile LNG supply chains can be. LNG is not immune to geopolitics; it is one of its most sensitive instruments. At the same time, LNG is also not immune to US domestic politics or emotions in Washington. Opposition to exports is growing across parts of the American political spectrum, especially in MAGA quarters, driven by price concerns and environmental arguments. Moves influencing permitting, as well as infrastructure constraints and election cycles, will affect future US export capacity. Brussels and others don’t have any influence over these dynamics. Still, the EU has tied its energy system to them.
For Europe, Groningen will matter. Even a limited, emergency-only domestic fallback changes Europe’s position, as it directly reduces the existing absolute dependence on LNG. The optionality of Groningen will also dampen price shocks and restore a measure of internal resilience. The Dutch Groningen gas field is not replacing US LNG, but it is partly eroding its monopoly power.
Washington will not see Groningen as a threat, but mostly as a support for Europe’s energy stability. With Groningen, there will be more buffers, so less panic and price spikes will be rippling into global markets. Brussels, however, is looking at a very uncomfortable situation. Its energy independence narrative has started to look less like a strategy and more like wishful thinking.
Most European countries, including the EU, have confused diversification with sovereignty. Sovereignty means retaining the ability to act, not having many suppliers. By dismantling domestic capacity in the name of transition, Europe has unilaterally surrendered its ability to do so. Maintaining Groningen’s infrastructure, however, is a rare surviving remnant of a different philosophy, one that prioritizes resilience over optimization.
Europe’s energy transition has been framed as a linear journey. Still, it is now clear that all systems have bottlenecks, such as energy grids, hydrogen timelines, and the fact that storage cannot substitute for molecules during prolonged stress events. Even though Europe’s gas demand has declined, it has not eliminated vulnerability. To dismantle every legacy asset, such as Groningen, is not progress but strategic amnesia.
It is also clear that the American LNG bazooka will remain powerful, but it is not a substitute for European self-insurance. LNG is global, contested, and political, while Groningen is local, controversial, and controllable. That is the main difference that will matter for the Netherlands and the EU in a crisis. Brussels is facing a choice not between transition and security, but between a naïve or a resilient transition. Groningen belongs to the latter.
The EU’s gas fallacy-“independence through LNG diversification”-is not surviving serious scrutiny. It has become structurally dependent on US LNG. This is now forcing uncomfortable recalculations. The gas illusion has shattered. Groningen is the first visible crack.
By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com
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